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Abstract. We provide conditions under which seriality is preserved dur-
ing an update in the BMS framework. We consider not only whether the
entire updated model is serial but also whether its generated submod-
els are serial. We also introduce the notion of crazy formulas which are
formulas such that after being publicly announced at least one of the
agents’ beliefs become inconsistent.
1 Introduction
Providing formalisms which allow agents to reason adequately about belief and
belief change is an important goal in artiﬁcial intelligence so that artiﬁcial agents
can act autonomously and rationally in a given environment. An obvious re-
quirement for these agents should be that their beliefs always remain consistent
whatever happens.
One way to represent formally the agents’ beliefs about a given (static) situ-
ation is by means of an epistemic model. Expressing that the agents’ beliefs are
consistent amounts to assume that the accessibility relations of the epistemic
model are serial.
The next step is to introduce events and to model their eﬀects on the agents’
beliefs. An inﬂuential formalism has been proposed in dynamic epistemic logic
by Baltag, Moss and Solecki (to which we will refer by the term BMS [3]) that
deals with this issue. Their idea is to represent how an event occurring in this
situation is perceived by the agents by means of an event model and then to
deﬁne a formal update mechanism that speciﬁes how the agents update their
beliefs according to this event model and the original epistemic model. This
yields a new epistemic model corresponding to the resulting situation. However,
as it turns out, it is quite possible formally that this new epistemic model is not
serial, even if the original epistemic model and the event model were serial. For
example, if agent A believes ¬φ then after a public announcement of φ agent
A’s accessibility relation is not serial anymore. Specifying formally under which
conditions this happens in general (and not only for public announcements) has
not been studied so far. In this paper we tackle this issue and also introduce some
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formulas, called ‘crazy formulas’, such that some of the agents’ beliefs always
become inconsistent after they are publicly announced: they become ‘crazy’.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the BMS system
together with the deﬁnitions of seriality and generated (sub)model. In Section 3,
we provide conditions under which the entire updated epistemic model is serial
and introduce what we call ‘crazy formulas’. In Section 4, we investigate under
which conditions a generated submodel of the entire updated epistemic model is
serial. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 The BMS System
In this paper, Φ is a set of propositional letters and G is a ﬁnite set of agents.
2.1 Epistemic Model and Generated Submodel
Epistemic model. An epistemic model is just a particular kind of Kripke
model [5] where instead of having a single accessibility relation we have a set of
accessibility relations, one for each agent.
Definition 1. An epistemic model M is a triple M = (W,R, V ) such that
– W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
– R : G → 2W×W assigns an accessibility relation to each agent;
– V : Φ → 2W assigns a set of possible worlds to each propositional letter and
is called a valuation.
If M = (W,R, V ) is an epistemic model, a pair (M,wa) with wa ∈ W is called
a pointed epistemic model. We also write Rj = R(j) and Rj(w) = {w′ ∈ W |
wRjw
′}, and w ∈ M for w ∈ W .
Intuitively, a pointed epistemic model (M,wa) represents from an external point
of view how the actual world wa is perceived by the agents G. The possible
worlds W are the relevant worlds needed to deﬁne such a representation and the
valuation V speciﬁes which propositional facts (such as ‘it is raining’) are true
in these worlds. Finally the accessibility relations Rj model the notion of belief.
We set w′ ∈ Rj(w) in case the world w′ is compatible with agent j’s belief in
world w. We can then deﬁne the notion of seriality for epistemic models.
Definition 2. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model. We say that M is
serial when for all j ∈ G, Rj satisﬁes the following condition:
Seriality: for all w ∈ W , Rj(w) = ∅.
Intuitively, an epistemic model which is not serial means that in the correspond-
ing situation there is an agent j whose beliefs are inconsistent. More precisely,
it means that it is not common belief that the agents’ beliefs are consistent.
Now inspiring ourselves from modal logic, we can deﬁne a language for epis-
temic models. The modal operator is just replaced by a ‘belief’ operator, one for
each agent.
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Definition 3. The language LU is deﬁned as follows:
LU : φ ::=  | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Bjφ | Uφ
where p ranges over Φ and j over G. Moreover, φ ∨ φ′ is an abbreviation for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′); φ → φ′ is an abbreviation for ¬φ ∨ φ′; Bˆjφ is an abbreviation for
¬Bj¬φ; Oφ is an abbreviation for ¬U¬φ; and ⊥ is an abbreviation for ¬.
Finally, by L we denote the language LU without the universal modality U .
Intuitively, Bjφ means that agent j believes that the formula φ is true. U is the
universal modality which is introduced here only for technical reasons in order to
express the seriality preservation conditions. Now we can give a genuine meaning
to the formulas of this language by deﬁning truth conditions for these formulas
on the class of epistemic models.
Definition 4. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model and w ∈ W . M,w |= φ
is deﬁned inductively as follows:
M,w |= 
M,w |= p iﬀ w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬φ iﬀ not M,w |= φ
M,w |= φ ∧ φ′ iﬀ M,w |= φ and M,w |= φ′
M,w |= Bjφ iﬀ for all v ∈ Rj(w),M, v |= φ
M,w |= Uφ iﬀ for all v ∈ W,M, v |= φ
We write M |= φ for M,w |= φ for all w ∈ M . If C is a class of epistemic
models, we write |=C φ when for all M ∈ C, M |= φ. Finally, we write |= φ when
for all epistemic model M , M |= φ.
So agent j believes φ in world w (formally M,w |= Bjφ) if φ is true in all the
worlds that agent j considers possible (in world w). M,w |= Uφ expresses that
φ is valid in the model M . The universal modality is thus a stronger notion than
the common belief modality often used in epistemic logic.
Example 1. We take up the coin example of [3]. Assume there are two agents Ann
and Bob who are in a room where there is a coin in a box. The coin is actually
heads up but the box is closed. So both of them do not know whether the coin
is heads or tails up. Now assume that Bob cheats and looks at the coin, Ann
suspecting nothing about it. This resulting situation is modeled in the pointed
epistemic model (M,wa) of Figure 1. The accessibility relations are represented
by arrows indexed by A (standing for Ann) or B (standing for Bob); p stands
for ‘the coin is heads up’ and the boxed world wa stands for the actual world.
Now thanks to the language L we can express what is true in this situation. For
example, Bob correctly believes that the coin is heads up: M,wa |= p ∧ BBp;
while Ann believes that he does not know whether the coin is heads or tails up:
M,wa |= BA(¬BBp ∧ ¬BB¬p).
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Fig. 1. The coin example
Generated submodel. An epistemic model might contain some information
that is not relevant to model a given situation. We now deﬁne the notion of
generated submodel that discards this useless information.
Definition 5. Let M = (W,R, V ) and M ′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) be two epistemic
models and wa ∈ W .
– We say that M ′ is a submodel of M if W ′ ⊆ W ; for all j ∈ G, R′j =
Rj ∩ (W ′ ×W ′) and for all p ∈ Φ, V ′(p) = V (p)∩W ′. We also say that M ′
is the restriction of M to W ′.
– The submodel of M generated by wa is the restriction of M to (
⋃
j∈G
Rj)∗(wa)1.
In case the submodel of M generated by wa is M itself, we say that M is gen-
erated by wa and that wa is the root of M .
Proposition 1. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model and M ′ a submodel
of M generated by some wa ∈ W . Then for all w ∈ M ′ and all φ ∈ L, M,w |= φ
iﬀ M ′, w |= φ.
This proposition entails that in a pointed epistemic model (M,wa) where wa
stands for the actual world, the part of the model M that is really relevant for
us to model the corresponding situation is the submodel of M generated by wa.
2.2 Event Model
Epistemic models are used to model how the agents perceive the actual world in
terms of beliefs about the world and about the other agents’ beliefs. The insight
of the BMS approach is that one can describe how an event is perceived by the
agents in a very similar way. Indeed, the agents’ perception of an event can also
be described in terms of beliefs: for example, while Bob looks at the coin and
sees that it is heads up (event aa) Ann believes that nothing happens (event
b). This leads them to deﬁne the notion of event model whose deﬁnition is very
similar to that of an epistemic model.
1 If R is a relation, R+ is defined by R+(w) = {v| there is w1, . . . , wn = v such that
wiRwi+1}. R∗ is defined by R∗(w) = {w} ∪R+(w). See [5].
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Fig. 2. Public announcement of BBp
Definition 6. An event model A is a triple A = (E,R, Pre) such that
– E is a ﬁnite and non-empty set of possible events;
– R : G → 2E×E assigns an accessibility relation to each agent;
– Pre : E → L assigns an epistemic formula to each possible event.
If A = (E,R, Pre) is an event model, a pair (A, aa) where aa ∈ E is called a
pointed event model. We also write Rj = R(j) and Rj(a) = {b ∈ E | aRjb},
and a ∈ A for a ∈ E.
The main diﬀerence with the deﬁnition of an epistemic model is that we no
longer have a valuation V but instead a function Pre. This function is supposed
to specify under which condition an event can physically take place in a possible
world.
Example 2. Assume that an external agent announces publicly that Bob believes
that the coin is heads up (formally BBp). This event is depicted in Figure 2.
There, aa stands for ‘the external agent truthfully announces that Bob believes
that the coin is heads up’. Because this event is correctly perceived by Ann and
Bob, aa is the only event considered possible by them. Finally, for this truthful
announcement to be made in a possible world, Bob has indeed to believe that
the coin is heads up in this world (BBp).
2.3 Product Update
Now, in reality after (or during) this event e, the agents update their beliefs
by taking into account these two pieces of information: the event e and the
initial situation s. This gives rise to a new situation s × e. This actual update
is rendered formally by the following mathematical update product between a
pointed epistemic model and a pointed event model.
Definition 7. Let M = (W,R, V,wa) be a pointed epistemic model and A =
(E,R, Pre, aa) a pointed event model such that M,wa |= Pre(aa). We de-
ﬁne their update product to be the pointed epistemic model M ⊗ A = (W ⊗
E,R′, V ′, w′a) where
1. W ⊗ E = {(w, a) ∈ W × E | M,w |= Pre(a)};
2. (v, b) ∈ R′j(w, a) iﬀ v ∈ Rj(w) and b ∈ Rj(a);
3. V ′(p) = {(w, a) ∈ W ⊗ E | w ∈ V (p)};
4. w′a = (wa, aa).
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Fig. 3. Failure of seriality preservation
Example 3. This example shows that seriality might not be preserved during an
update. If we update the epistemic model depicted in Figure 1 by the truthful
public announcement that Bob believes that the coin is heads up (formally BBp)
depicted in Figure 2 then we get the epistemic model depicted on the right of
Figure 3 where Ann’s accessibility relation is not serial.
3 Seriality Preservation for the Entire BMS Product
3.1 Theory
First of all, for a given epistemic model M and a given event model A, we say
that the update product M ⊗ A is deﬁned if there is w ∈ M and a ∈ A such
that M,w |= Pre(a). We introduce this deﬁnition because seriality of updated
models makes sense only for deﬁned updated models.
Proposition 2. Let A be a serial event model and let M be an epistemic model.
M ⊗A is deﬁned and serial iﬀ
M |= O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
∧ U ∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
.
Proof. M |= O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
clearly means that the model M ⊗ A is deﬁned.
Now it remains to prove that M ⊗A is serial iﬀ
M |= U ∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
.
– Assume that M |= U ∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
(*). Let (w, a) ∈
M ⊗A and j ∈ G. Then M,w |= Pre(a). So M,w |= ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b) by
(*). Then M,w |= Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b). So there is v ∈ Rj(w) and b ∈ Rj(a) such
that M, v |= Pre(b). Then there is (v, b) ∈ M ⊗A such that (v, b) ∈ Rj(w, a)
by deﬁnition of M ⊗A. So M ⊗A is serial.
Consistency Preservation and Crazy Formulas in BMS 27
– Assume that M  U
∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
. Then there is
w ∈ M and a ∈ A such that M,w |= Pre(a)∧
(
∨
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
¬Pre(b)
)
. Then
there is j ∈ G such that M,w |= Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
¬Pre(b) (**). So (w, a) ∈ M ⊗A
but there is no v ∈ Rj(w) and b ∈ Rj(a) such that (v, b) ∈ Rj(w, a). Indeed,
otherwise we would have M,w |= Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b), which contradicts (**).
So M ⊗A is not serial.
We write S(A) = O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
∧ U ∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
.
O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
expresses that the updated model M ⊗A is deﬁned.
U
∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b)
)
expresses that the updated model M⊗
A is serial. Note that the seriality conditions bear only on M and that M does
not need to be serial for the proposition to hold. But of course if M is serial then
the proposition still holds. However, if the event model is not serial then one
cannot get a serial updated model. From this proposition we can easily prove
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let C be a class of epistemic models and A a serial event model.
|=C ¬S(A)
iﬀ there is no epistemic model M ∈ C such that M ⊗A is deﬁned and serial.
In other words this corollary tells us under which condition, for a given event
model A, whatever epistemic model M we chose, M ⊗A will not be deﬁned or
not serial. If this condition is fulﬁlled that would mean intuitively that in any
epistemic situation, if the event (corresponding to this event model) is performed,
then afterwards in any case (some of) the agents’ beliefs are inconsistent. This is
of course counter intuitive and we should then avoid such kinds of event (models).
3.2 Crazy Formulas
We are going to give an example of a class of epistemic formulas such that after
they are publicly announced some of the agents’ beliefs become inconsistent.
Definition 8. A crazy formula is a satisﬁable formula φ ∈ L such that
|= φ →
∨
j∈G
Bj¬φ.
Proposition 3. Let φ be a crazy formula and let A be the event model corre-
sponding to the public announcement of φ. Then there is no epistemic model M
such that M ⊗A is deﬁned and serial.
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Proof. Thanks to Corollary 1 it suﬃces to prove that |= ¬S(A) i.e. |= Oφ →
O
(
φ ∧ ∨
j∈G
Bj¬φ
)
because S(A) = Oφ∧U
(
φ → ∧
j∈G
Bˆjφ
)
. Let M be an epis-
temic model such that M |= Oφ. Let w ∈ M such that M,w |= φ. Then by
deﬁnition of a crazy formula M,w |= φ ∧ ∨
j∈G
Bj¬φ. Then M,w |= φ ∧
∨
j∈G
Bj¬φ
i.e. M |= O
(
φ ∧ ∨
j∈G
Bj¬φ
)
.
Proposition 4. φ = ψ ∧Bi¬ψ, where ψ ∈ L is a satisﬁable formula, is a crazy
formula.
Proof. One can easily show that |= φ → Bi¬φ.
We can compare this notion of crazy formula with the notion of selfrefuting and
successful formulas studied in [7]. Selfrefuting formulas are formulas that are no
longer true after they are publicly announced. An example of such formulas is
Moore’s sentence p∧¬Bjp: if it is announced then p becomes common belief and
in particular Bjp becomes true. Here our formulas are a bit diﬀerent: after they
are publicly announced some of the agents’ beliefs become inconsistent. On the
other hand, successful formulas are formulas which are always true after being
publicly announced. One can show that crazy formulas are not successful.
4 Seriality Preservation for Generated Submodels
One should note that it is quite possible that an updated model consists of
several disjoint epistemic models. But in practice, as we said in Section 2.1, the
epistemic model we are really interested in is the submodel of the entire updated
model generated by the actual world (wa, aa) . So, more generally, we would like
to know under which conditions a particular generated submodel of the entire
updated model is serial. That is what we are going to investigate now.
Definition 9. Let A be an event model, a ∈ A and n ∈ N. We deﬁne δn(a)
inductively as follows.
– δ0(a) = Pre(a);
– δn+1(a) = δ0(a) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
δn(b) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) → δn(b)).
Intuitively, M,w |= δn(a) means that the submodel of M⊗A generated by (w, a)
is deﬁned and serial up to modal depth n. This interpretation is endorsed by the
following two lemmas which will be used to prove the main proposition.
Lemma 1. Let M be an epistemic model and let A be an event model. For all
w ∈ M , a ∈ A, n ∈ N,
M,w |= δn+1(a) iﬀ
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M,w |= δ1(a) and for all v ∈ M such that w = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjnwn = v
such that there are a = a0Rj1a1Rj2 . . . Rjnan = b such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n},
M,wi |= Pre(ai),
M, v |=
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
c∈Rj(b)
Pre(c)
Proof. We prove it by induction on n. The case n = 0 is clear. We prove the
induction step. Assume the property is true for n.
– Assume M,w |= δn+2(a). Then M,w |= δ1(a) because δn+1(b) → Pre(b)
and δ1(a) = Pre(a) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b). Let v ∈ M such that w =
w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjn+1 wn+1 = v and such that there are a = a0Rj1a1Rj2 . . .
Rjn+1an+1 = b such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1}, M,wi |= Pre(ai).
By assumption, M,w |= ∧
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) → δn+1(b)). So M,w1 |=
∧
b∈Rj1 (a)
(Pre(b) → δn+1(b)). Besides a1 ∈ Rj1(a) and M,w1 |= Pre(a1). So
M,w1 |= δn+1(a1).
Then, by inductionhypothesis, for allv′ such thatw1=w′1Rj2 . . . Rjn+1w
′
n+1
= v′ such that there are a1 = a′1Rj2 . . . Rjn+1a
′
n+1 = a
′ such that for all i,
M,w′i |= Pre(a′i),
M, v′ |=
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b′∈Rj(a′)
Pre(b′).
So M, v |= ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
c∈Rj(b)
Pre(c)
– Assume M,w |= δ1(a) and assume that for all v ∈ M such that w =
w0Rj1 . . . Rjn wn+1 = v such that there are a = a0Rj1 . . . Rjnan+1 = b
such that for all i, M,wi |= Pre(ai),
M, v |=
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
c∈Rj(b)
Pre(c).
Now,assumeM,w  δn+2(a).ThenM,w |=¬Pre(a)∨
(
∨
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
¬δn+1(b)
)
∨
(
∨
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) ∧ ¬δn+1(b))
)
.
• M,w |= ¬Pre(a) is impossible by assumption.
• Assume M,w |= ∨
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
¬δn+1(b). Then for some i ∈ G, M,w |=
Bi
∧
b∈Ri(a)
¬δn+1(b). Then for all v ∈ Ri(w) and all b ∈ Ri(a), M, v |=
¬δn+1(b) (*).
30 G. Aucher
But by assumption M,w |= δ1(a), i.e. M,w |=
Pre(a) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b). Then M,w |= Bˆi
∨
b∈Ri(a)
Pre(b), i.e. there
is v ∈ Ri(w) and b ∈ Ri(a) such that M, v |= Pre(b) (1).
So M, v |= ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b) (2) by assumption (take w1 = . . . =
wn = v and a1 = . . . = an = b).
Then by (1) and (2) we get M, v |= δ1(b).
Besides, by assumption and because wRiv and aRib, for all u such
that v = v0Rj1 . . . Rjnu such that there are b = b0Rj1 . . . Rjnbn = c such
that for all i M, vi |= Pre(bi)
M,u |=
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
d∈Rj(c)
Pre(d).
So M, v |= δn+1(b) by induction hypothesis. This is impossible by (*).
• Assume M,w |= ∨
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) ∧ ¬δn+1(b)).
Then there is i ∈ G, v ∈ Ri(w) and b ∈ Ri(a) such that M, v |= Pre(b)∧
¬δn+1(b).
By the same argument as above we get to a contradiction.
So ﬁnally M,w |= δn+2(a).
Lemma 2. Let M be a ﬁnite epistemic model and A be a ﬁnite serial event
model. Let n = |M | · |A|.2 For all w ∈ M and a ∈ A such that M,w |= Pre(a),
1. Rj(w, a) = ∅ for all j ∈ G iﬀ M,w |=
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b);
2. (v, b) ∈
(
⋃
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w, a) iﬀ there are w = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjnwn−1 = v
and
a = a0Rj1a1Rj2 . . . Rjnan−1 = b such that for all i, M,wi |= Pre(ai).
Proof. 1. Assume M,w |= ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b). Then for all j ∈ G, there is
v ∈ Rj(w) and b ∈ Rj(a) such that M, v |= Pre(b). Then, by deﬁnition of the
product update, for all j, there is (v, b) ∈ M ⊗A such that (v, b) ∈ Rj(w, a).
So for all j ∈ G, Rj(w, a) = ∅.
Assume M,w 
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b). Then there is j ∈ G such that for
all v ∈ Rj(w) and for all b ∈ Rj(a), M, v  Pre(b). Then, by deﬁnition of
the product update, there is no (v, b) ∈ M ⊗ A such that (v, b) ∈ Rj(w, a).
So Rj(w, a) = ∅ for some j ∈ G.
2. M⊗A is of cardinality at most n due to our hypothesis that n = |M | · |A|. So
every world (v, b) ∈ M ⊗A such that (v, b) ∈
(
⋃
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w, a) is accessible
from (w, a) in at most n− 1 steps. So,
2 |M | (resp. |A|) is the number of possible worlds (resp. events) of M (resp. A).
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(v, b) ∈
(
⋃
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w, a) iﬀ
there are j1, . . . , jn−1 and (w1, a1), . . . , (wn−1, an−1) ∈ M ⊗A such that
(w, a)Rj1 (w1, a1)Rj2 . . . Rjn−1(wn−1, an−1) = (v, b) iﬀ
there are w = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjn−1wn−1 = v and a = a0Rj1a1Rj2 . . . Rjn−1
an−1 = b such that for all i, M,wi |= Pre(ai).
Proposition 5. Let M be a ﬁnite epistemic model and let A be a ﬁnite serial
event model. Let w ∈ M , a ∈ A and n = |M | · |A|.
The submodel of M ⊗A generated by (w, a) is deﬁned and serial iﬀ
M,w |= δn(a).
Proof. First, note that the submodel of M ⊗ A generated by (w, a) is deﬁned
and serial iﬀ
– (w, a) is deﬁned;
– Rj(w, a) = ∅ for all j ∈ G;
– Rj(v, b) = ∅ for all (v, b) ∈
(
⋃
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w, a) and for all j ∈ G.
Then we get easily the expected result by Lemma 2 and Lemma 1. Indeed, (w, a)
is deﬁned and Rj(w, a) = ∅ for all j ∈ G amounts to say that M,w |= δ1(a). And
Rj(v, b) = ∅ for all (v, b) ∈
(
⋃
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w, a) and for all j ∈ G amounts to say
that for all v ∈ M such that w = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjnwn = v such that there are
a = a0Rj1a1Rj2 . . . Rjnan = b such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, M,wi |= Pre(ai),
M, v |= ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
c∈Rj(b)
Pre(c).
This proposition is coherent with our interpretation of M,w |= δn(a). As we
said, intuitively, M,w |= δn(a) means that the submodel of M ⊗ A generated
by (w, a) is (deﬁned and) serial up to modal depth n. So, if n is larger than
the modal depth of the submodel M ⊗ A generated by (w, a) (which is the
case if n = |M | · |A|) then all the worlds accessible from (w, a) are serial. So
this generated submodel is indeed serial. Accordingly, this also entails that it
should be serial for any given modal depth. That is what the following property
expresses.
Proposition 6. Let M be a ﬁnite epistemic model and let A be a ﬁnite and
serial event model. Let w ∈ M,a ∈ A and n = |M | · |A|.
If M,w |= δn(a) then for all m ≥ n, M,w |= δm(a).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that for all v ∈ M there are
w1, . . . , wn−1 such thatw = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjnwn = v iﬀ there arew1, . . . , wm−1
such that w = w0Rj1w1Rj2 . . . Rjmwm = v.
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Similarly, if a submodel of M ⊗ A generated by (w, a) is serial up to a given
modal depths d then it should also be serial up to all modal depth smaller than
d. The following proposition proves that it is indeed the case.
Proposition 7. For all event models A and a ∈ A, if n ≥ n′ then |= δn(a) →
δn
′
(a).
Proof. Let A be an event model and a ∈ A. We prove it by induction on n. If
n = 0 or n = 1 then the result trivially holds. Assume it is true for a given n ≥ 1.
Assume |= δn+1(a), i.e. |= δ0(a) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
δn(b) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) →
δn(b)).
By induction hypothesis, for all b ∈ A, |= δn(b) → δn−1(b). So
|=
⎛
⎝δ0(a) ∧
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
δn(b) ∧
∧
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) → δn(b))
⎞
⎠ →
⎛
⎝δ0(a) ∧
∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
δn−1(b) ∧
∧
j∈G
Bj
∧
b∈Rj(a)
(Pre(b) → δn−1(b))
⎞
⎠ .
i.e. |= δn+1(a) → δn(a). So for all n′ ≤ n + 1, |= δn+1(a) → δn′(a) by induction
hypothesis.
Finally, we can strike some relationship between the seriality conditions for the
entire updated model and for the generated submodels of the entire updated
model. Indeed, if the entire updated model is serial then all its generated sub-
models should be serial up to any modal depth:
Proposition 8. Let M be an epistemic model and A be a serial event model.
if M |= S(A) then for all n ≥ 0 M |= ∧
a∈A
(Pre(a) → δn(a)).
Proof. By induction on n.
Besides, one can notice that the entire updated model is serial if and only if
all its generated submodels are serial. But in fact, because we consider all the
generated submodels, it suﬃces that these generated submodels be serial only
up to modal depth 1. That is actually the intuition that led to the deﬁnition of
S(A).
Proposition 9. Let M be an epistemic model and let A be a serial event model.
Then,
M |= S(A) ↔ O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
∧ U
∧
a∈A
(
Pre(a) → δ1(a)) .
O
(
∨
a∈A
Pre(a)
)
expresses that the updated model is deﬁned. The rest of the
formula expresses its seriality. Note that δ1(a) = Pre(a) ∧ ∧
j∈G
Bˆj
∨
b∈Rj(a)
Pre(b),
so we have rediscovered the deﬁnition of S(A).
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5 Conclusion
We have given conditions under which an entire updated model and its generated
submodels are serial. We also introduced the notion of crazy formula which are
formulas such that after being publicly announced at least one of the agents’
beliefs become inconsistent. We could wonder whether other properties are also
preserved during an update. It has been shown that most of the relevant ones
like reﬂexivity, transitivity and euclidicity are preserved [3].
The fact that seriality is not preserved in the BMS system means that it should
be enriched with some sort of revision mechanisms so that seriality is restored.
For example, in Example 3 Ann should revise her beliefs about Bob after the
public announcement. To do this, most of the existing approaches resort to a
richer framework by introducing plausibility [1,6] or probability [2,4] but none of
them tackles the issue directly in its original form by manipulating accessibility
relations. This paper is a preliminary step in that direction.
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